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ABSTRACT. One of the most persistent mysteries in the history of humankind is the collapse of ancient societies. 
It is puzzling that societies that achieved such high levels of development disappeared so suddenly. It has been 
argued that overexploitation of environmental resources played a role in the collapse of such societies. In this 
paper, we propose an explanation why overexploitation seems more common in ancient societies that built larger 
structures. This explanation is based on the well-studied sunk-cost effect in human decision making: decisions are 
often based on past investments rather than expected future returns. This leads to an unwillingness to abandon 
something (e. g., a settlement) if a great deal has been invested in it, even if future prospects are dim. Empirical 
study suggests that there are indications of sunk-cost effects in the histories of several ancient societies. A stylized 
model is used to illustrate under which conditions societal collapse may be expected. Finally, we discuss the 
consequences of these insights for current societies. 
 “The most important thing we can learn 
from the past is that no earlier civilization 
has survived. And the larger the pyramids 
and temples and statues they build in 
honour of their god or themselves, the 
harder was the fall.” Thor Heyerdahl 
(1998). 
INTRODUCTION 
The impressive temples and pyramids of ancient times 
are symbols of mighty societies. How is it possible 
that such highly developed societies have disappeared? 
One explanation is that the environmental resource 
base of these societies was depleted (Tainter 1988, 
Yoffee and Cowgill 1988, Ponting 1991, Diamond 
1997, 2002). The Mayan, Mesopotamian, and 
Polynesian societies are famous examples of collapses 
that were likely caused by resource depletion (Tainter 
1988, Ponting 1991). Mesopotamia, lying in the river 
basins of the Tigris and the Euphrates, was able to 
build up a complex society through intensive 
agriculture and excessive irrigation. However, their 
irrigation practices led to a rise in saline groundwater, 
thus destroying agricultural productivity. In a similar 
manner, intensive agricultural practices led to soil 
erosion and decreasing agricultural productivity. The 
Polynesians who discovered and settled on Easter 
Island also developed a society in the 1000 years 
following their arrival, but they deforested the island 
and greatly reduced the terrestrial resources necessary 
to sustain the increasing population and ritual 
activities. Their society had collapsed before the 
Europeans arrived in 1722.  
Tainter (1988) defines collapse as a phenomenon 
where a society “displays a rapid, significant loss of an 
established level of socio-political complexity.” The 
use of the term “collapse” in archaeology is more 
subtle. Some archaeologists argue that we have to talk 
about transformations or just abandonment of 
settlements. In this paper, we may sometimes be less 
subtle in our use of the word “collapse” than our 
colleagues in archaeology. In our model, described 
later in this paper, we do not include socio-political 
complexity explicitly and, therefore, we refer in our 
model exercise to collapse simply if population levels 
decline rapidly and significantly. Many explanations 
have been proposed for collapses of ancient societies, 
varying from depletion of vital resources to invasions 
of barbarians and natural catastrophes (earthquakes, 
climate shifts, floods, etc.). Tainter proposed an 
economic explanation of collapse. During 
development, societies increase in complexity. That is, 
they comprise more parts and more kinds of parts, and 
they develop greater integration of parts. At a certain 
level of complexity, the costs of increasing complexity 
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surpass the benefits, leading to a collapse (Tainter 
1988).  
In this paper, Tainter's concept is extended using 
insights from research on human decision making. The 
central question we address is “why” ancient societies 
invested beyond an optimal level of complexity, 
leading to overharvesting of their renewable resources. 
In our view, an important factor that might explain 
these systematic dynamics is the “sunk-cost effect”—
where human decision making is typically influenced 
by the level of prior investments (in a wide sense, 
including capital, experience, and spiritual values). 
According to conventional economic theory, only the 
incremental costs and benefits of the current options 
should be included in decision making. However, as 
explained in some detail later, numerous examples 
show that humans do take into account prior 
investment when they consider what course of action 
to follow.  
As an illustration, consider the case of the Greenland 
Norse. These colonists might have survived if they had 
adopted a maritime hunting lifestyle like that of the 
Greenland Inuit. However, the Norse had made a big 
investment in inner-fjord pastures to support oversized 
stone churches and a cathedral, and they were 
unwilling to abandon this investment, probably 
because of a sunk-cost effect (Pringle 1997). The 
economic effects of sunk costs on management of 
renewable resources have been studied earlier, for 
example in fisheries (Clark et al. 1979) and the rubber 
and aluminum industries (Barham et al. 1998). Such 
economic sunk-cost impacts appear when capital 
cannot be sold in times of a declining capital stock, 
which in turn affects strategic investment behavior. 
Empirical examples show that sunk costs can lead to a 
hysteresis, that is, a delay in recovery following a 
recession. These lines of investigation merely consider 
an economic interpretation of sunk costs (capital 
investments) to explain observed overcapacities. 
However, in this study, we elaborate on implications 
of the sunk-cost effect studied in a broader sense in 
cognitive science, including various social and 
psychological factors.  
We show that such a sunk-cost effect will tend to keep 
societies continuing about their business as usual in 
periods of stress rather than structurally changing their 
activities or moving to new places with better 
opportunities. We use simple model analyses to 
explore under which circumstances the sunk-cost 
effect should be expected to become most pronounced.  
In this paper, we first present Tainter's (1988) 
economically based framework for explaining the 
collapse of ancient societies, and discuss how this can 
be related to the ecological concept of resilience. We 
then explain the sunk-cost effect, and illustrate that 
this hypothesis relates to observations in archaeology. 
Finally, we propose and analyze a bioeconomic model, 
and discuss the implications of the derived insights for 
current management of ecological economic systems.  
COMPLEXITY, RESILIENCE, AND THE 
COLLAPSE OF SOCIETIES 
Tainter (1988) argued that there is an underlying 
process within societies that explains their subsequent 
collapse. When societies grow, their complexity 
increases. In the beginning, investments in complexity 
(for example, in agricultural and resource production, 
hierarchy, information processing, education, and 
defense), are beneficial because the easiest, most 
general, most accessible, and least expensive solutions 
are attempted first. When the least costly solutions are 
depleted, and technological development has not 
provided new ones, more expensive solutions need to 
be developed for challenges in complex societies. 
Such solutions to challenges further complexify the 
society, and, in turn, make solutions in the future even 
more expensive. As a result (Tainter 1988), the costs 
of solutions to new challenges in the complex society 
increase to such a level that a further increase in 
complexity has negative marginal returns, and the 
society becomes vulnerable to collapse.  
It is important to note the role of technology here. 
Brunks (2002) argues that “societies always tend to 
evolve toward the maximum level of complexity that 
is possible given current technological constraints.” 
This explains why current societies reach higher levels 
of complexity than the Romans and the Mayas. We are 
more efficient at exploiting resources to increase 
complexity.  
Tainter (1988) relates complexity to the size of a 
society, the number and distinctiveness of its parts, the 
variety of specialized social roles that it incorporates, 
the number of distinct social personalities present, and 
the variety of mechanisms for organizing these into a 
coherent, functioning whole. With respect to the 
history of humanity, it is only very recently that 
complex societies emerged. For most of our history, 
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we lived as low-density hunters and foragers, and there 
is no simple explanation for the increased complexity, 
but domestication of plants and animals, the 
development of agriculture, and the production of 
regular surplus are factors that contributed to it. 
Tainter (1988) argues that the development of 
complexity is an economic process. Complexity levies 
costs and yields benefits. Assuming that easy solutions 
are used first, costs of increasing complexity rise faster 
than the benefits, such that there are diminishing 
returns to the degree of complexity and, in some cases, 
even negative returns. For example, simple 
inexpensive solutions are adopted before moving to 
the more complex and expensive ones, implying that 
investments in societies may become more complex 
over time. Societies initially benefit from increasing 
complexity because the initial strategies work and give 
high returns per unit of investment (Tainter 2000). For 
a period, increasing complexity can continue to 
generate positive feedbacks. The successful efforts of 
our ancestors to provide food for an increasing 
population led to more intensive agricultural practices, 
as well as continued population growth. However, no 
society can continue to increase in complexity and 
maintain stable or increasing returns forever.  
The resilience concept explains why, at an increasing 
level of complexity, ancient societies became 
vulnerable to disturbances such as droughts (Hodell et 
al. 1995, 2001, Weiss and Bradley 2001) and 
earthquakes (Nur and Cline 2000). During the growth 
phase of a society, a large amount of capital, including 
infrastructure, organizational structures, and 
knowledge, is built up, and complexity increases. This 
complexity reduces short-term variability of supply of 
food and water within the system.  
 
Fig. 1. Bifurcation diagram, where the solid lines indicate 
stable equilibria of the settlement and the dashed line 
represents an unstable equilibrium. Perturbation can shift 
the system into the alternative domain of attraction. F1 and 
F2 are bifurcation points.  
 
As a society increases in complexity, the investments 
in resource extraction, administration, organization, 
and defense increase. In the beginning, an increase in 
complexity is favorable, but there is a decreasing rate 
of return. This will make the society prone to collapse, 
because diminishing returns make complexity less 
attractive and increasing costs of solutions breed 
disaffection. Taxes and other costs rise to maintain the 
complexity, but benefits do not rise at the same rate. 
Finally, the society will reach a point, given 
technological constraints, beyond which an increase in 
complexity will lead to negative returns (Tainter 
1988).  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of disturbances. We can 
consider the resource isocline as an equilibrium curve 
with a catastrophe fold. Stochastic events that reduce 
the resource abundance (e. g., pests, fires, droughts) 
may have little effect in small settlements (upper left 
on R' = 0) but can bring the system across the border 
of the attraction basin of the overexploited state in 
large settlements (arrow), resulting in a crash. If sunk-
cost effects cause people to leave only at low resource 
levels, the settlement will grow until point F2 is 
reached, and a disturbance may cause the system to 
enter the other domain of attraction, leading the 
resource to crash, followed by abandonment of the 
settlement. The resources may recover eventually and 
a new settlement may be established, resulting in a 
cyclical development.  
Why does a society become vulnerable to disturbances at 
higher levels of complexity? One possible explanation 
can be found in the concept of resilience. This concept 
originates from the notion that ecosystems are able to 
absorb a certain amount of disturbance before they 
change structurally (Holling 1973). Systems can depart 
from an equilibrium steady state but remain within a so-
called stability domain. In a stability domain, the system 
is organized into a set of mutually reinforcing structures 
and processes. If sufficiently large or sufficiently durable, 
disturbances can cause a system to flip into another 
stability domain (Scheffer et al. 2001).  
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Tainter (2000) argues that increase in complexity is 
necessary to continue providing solutions for 
increasing population pressure. However, this 
explanation hardly seems satisfactory. When 
population pressure is high and increasing complexity 
brings negative marginal returns, it should, 
economically, be more desirable to reduce population 
pressure by, for example, migration. The question thus 
remains, “why” did ancient societies continue to 
increase in complexity and population size until they 
collapsed? In the following section, empirical evidence 
from animal and human behavior provides a possible 
explanation.  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM STUDIES 
ON SUNK-COST EFFECTS 
Economic theory suggests that prior investment should 
not influence consideration of current options. Only 
the incremental costs and benefits of the current 
options should influence the decision. However, there 
are numerous examples that show that humans do take 
into account prior investment when they consider what 
course of action to follow. With regard to human 
behavior, this is called the sunk-cost effect (cf. Arkes 
and Ayton 1999) and, in animal studies, it is referred 
to as the “Concorde fallacy” (cf. Dawkins and Carlisle 
1976). The literature on these phenomena is reviewed 
briefly below.  
The poor financial prospects of the Concorde were 
known long before the plane was completed, but the 
governments of the United Kingdom and France 
decided to continue production anyway on the grounds 
that they had already invested a lot of money. The 
term “Concorde fallacy” has been used to refer to 
lower animal behavior in relation to parental 
investments. Trivers (1972) defined parental 
investment as “any investment by the parent in an 
individual offspring that increases the offspring’s 
chance of surviving (and hence reproductive success) 
at the cost of the parent’s ability to invest in other 
offspring.” Typical examples are the defense of a nest 
and the feeding of young. According to Trivers (1972), 
in most species, male partners are more likely than 
female partners to desert the partner and the 
developing young because, in general, the male partner 
has invested very little compared with the female 
partner. Dawkins and Carlisle (1976) argue that 
Trivers’s reasoning is fallacious. They suggest an 
alternative reason why an older offspring is preferred. 
Of two offspring of different ages, the older is 
preferred not because of the magnitude of the prior 
investment, but because the expected magnitude of 
investment in the future is smaller for the older 
offspring. Thus, consideration of the incremental costs 
and benefits, not of sunk costs, explains the parental 
investment decisions. Many studies were carried out 
over the subsequent 20 years to test the Concorde 
fallacy for lower animals. However, in a review, Arkes 
and Ayton (1999) conclude that there is no evidence 
supporting the Concorde fallacy in behavior of lower 
animals.  
Although lower animals do not seem to suffer from the 
Concorde fallacy, many studies demonstrate the 
validity of the sunk-cost effect for humans (Arkes and 
Ayton 1999). For example, Staw and Hoang (1995) 
studied the performance of basketball players in the 
National Basketball Association (NBA). Individuals 
who were higher draft picks were given greater 
playing time regardless of the player’s performance. 
Because higher draft picks cost the team more money, 
both their greater playing time and their enhanced 
career longevity are examples of the influence of high 
sunk costs. Camerer and Weber (1999) tested other 
explanations against the conclusions of Staw and 
Hoang (1995), but still found the sunk-cost effect was 
the dominant explanation. Another example can be 
found in business. When entrepreneurs have started 
their own businesses, they are more likely to continue 
investing in less favorable prospects than are those 
who have purchased businesses from others 
(McCarthy et al. 1993).  
There is an interesting difference in test results 
between adults and children with regard to the sunk-
cost effect. Children under 10 years of age seem to be 
less susceptible to the sunk-cost effect than humans of 
older ages. Arkes and Ayton (1999) explain this by the 
fact that young humans have more modest cognitive 
abilities. These cognitive abilities are suggested to be 
the main explanation for sunk-cost effects, because 
humans, especially adults, tend to define complex 
strategies. Such strategies can be highly advantageous 
in some situations, but they can be detrimental if they 
are overgeneralized to situations in which such 
strategies are no longer appropriate. Humans are able 
to define abstract rules and apply them to new 
situations.  
One rule that can explain the sunk-cost effect is “Don’t 
waste” (Arkes 1996). This means avoiding 
abandonment of a (failing) course of action in which 
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resources are already invested. An example is the lost-
ticket scenario in which participants are asked whether 
they would still pay $10 for a theatre ticket after they 
(1) discover that they have lost a $10 bill or (2) 
discover that they have lost the ticket. If the ticket was 
already bought, the participant is much less likely to 
spend another $10 for another ticket (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1981). An explanation is that in case (1) 
the $10 lost was not specifically assigned to the ticket, 
but in case (2) they had already spent $10 and would 
thus experience a total price of $20 for the theater 
ticket.  
Escalation of commitment occurs when people or 
organizations who have committed resources to a 
project are inclined to “throw good money after bad” 
and maintain or increase their commitment to the 
project, even when its marginal costs exceed marginal 
benefits (Teger 1980, Camerer and Weber 1999). 
Escalation of commitment is very similar to the sunk-
cost effect. Most research is focused on individual 
decision making. The main explanation for observed 
escalation is self-justification (Brockner 1992). The 
idea of self-justification is that people do not like to 
admit that their past decisions were incorrect and, 
therefore, are trying to reaffirm the correctness of 
those earlier decisions.  
One might expect that irrational behavior would be 
corrected in groups. However, many studies suggest 
that groups make riskier decisions than the mean of 
decisions made by individuals. In fact, escalation of 
commitment is found in group decision making 
(Bazerman et al. 1984). Members of a group strive for 
unanimity. A typical goal for political decisions within 
small-scale societies is to reach consensus (Boehm 
1996). Once unanimity is reached, the easiest way to 
protect it is to stay committed to the group’s decision 
(Bazerman et al. 1984, Janis 1972). Thus, when the 
group is faced with a negative feedback, members will 
not suggest abandoning the earlier course of action, 
because this might disrupt the existing unanimity.  
From the literature on the Concorde fallacy, the sunk-
cost effect, and escalation of commitments, we can 
conclude that humans, especially adults, show 
investment behavior that may be denoted as a sunk-
cost effect. In the following sections, we analyze how 
this effect may explain the overshoot and collapse 
behavior of ancient societies. The underlying 
hypothesis is that when a society is totally flexible in 
its actions, the potential for collapse is reduced. In the 
case of total flexibility, people will move to other 
places when the society is confronted with a real 
scarcity of resources. Due to the sunk-cost effect, they 
hesitate because they would lose what they have built 
up in terms of knowledge, social networks, and 
physical and symbolic capital. People cannot leave 
without experiencing the costs of losing prior 
investments. Therefore, they will stay longer, 
stimulating a collapse of the society as a whole. This 
may explain why societies increase their complexity 
above the optimal level.  
SUNK-COST EFFECTS AND 
ARCHAEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 
In this section, we discuss some examples that 
illustrate possible evidence of the sunk-cost effect in 
archaeological data. Note that we do not argue that 
sunk-cost effects are the only or main cause of 
collapse of ancient populations. However, they may 
provide further insight into observed collapses.  
The prehispanic Pueblo (Anasazi) society provides a 
prominent example of the possible role of sunk-cost 
effects. The Anasazi constructed some of the largest 
non-earthen structures (e.g., Pueblo Bonito, Chaco 
Canyon, New Mexico) to be built in the USA before 
the Chicago skyscrapers of the 1880s. In the U.S. 
Southwest, the Anasazi built simple, small villages, 
but also large settlements that frequently show 
evidence of large and labor-costly multi-walled 
structures that are lacking at small sites. The remains 
of these Anasazi settlements are especially suitable for 
testing for sunk-cost effects, because tree-ring analysis 
of wood artifacts and high-resolution dating of 
construction activity in the small and large settlements 
can provide us with estimates of potential annual 
agricultural production. Janssen et al. (2003) have 
analyzed data from different settlements: Dolores, and 
Sand Canyon. They compared timber procurement 
events, indicating construction activities, against 
proxies for agricultural production derived from tree 
rings and they found that people tended to continue to 
invest in construction at large settlements even in 
periods of scarcity, whereas construction at small 
settlements was confined to periods of relative 
abundance. This is nicely in line with what we would 
expect from the sunk-cost hypothesis, which states that 
the more there is invested in a certain settlement, the 
more likely it is that investments will continue to be 
made in unfavorable circumstances.  
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In Sand Canyon, widespread violence during the late 
13th century may explain movements from small to 
large settlements and, therefore, might be an 
alternative explanation for observed construction 
patterns (Janssen et al. 2003). However, for the 
Dolores site, such an alternative explanation does not 
exist, and the sunk-cost effect provides the only 
obvious explanation for the observed patterns.  
If sunk-cost effects can lead to a collapse, a reduction 
in sunk costs should help in avoiding a collapse. An 
indication of this may be found in the history of the 
Byzantine society, which recovered from a series of 
crises by deliberately simplifying the complexity of 
their society (Tainter 2000). During the crises of the 
7th century, the Byzantines lost half their empire and 
their rulers realized they could not continue business 
as usual. The simplification of the complex society 
was implemented by removing the structure of ranks 
and honours, simplifying the civil administration, 
reducing governmental transaction costs, and cutting 
the costs of the army. All these changes reduced 
complexity and (sunk) costs, and were made despite 
past large investments.  
In the introduction, we referred to pyramids as 
symbols of mighty societies. Within the scholarly 
literature, this is a topic of debate. Diamond (2003) 
reviews this debate. Although there is evidence that 
some of the large pyramids were built before the 
“mighty” societies, it also seems that the aim of some 
of the big-structure builders was simply to impress 
others. Dunham (1994) discusses the temples of the 
Mayas, which may represent segregation, and thus are 
not symbols of a mighty unified Maya society. 
Dunham argues that, at a certain moment, each smaller 
community built their temples as symbols of 
independence. Note that these explanations are 
nonetheless consistent with our interpretation. Large 
complex structures like temples and pyramids 
contribute to the sunk-cost effects, together with other 
investments such as trade networks, roads, armies, 
palaces, sacred areas, etc.  
A MINIMAL BIOECONOMIC MODEL OF 
ANCIENT SOCIETIES 
Consider a stylized model of the long-term 
development of societies with three modules: the 
ecological resource dynamics, the human population 
dynamics, and the human activities. The model builds 
on the recent line of work in economic literature on 
ancient societies, such as the studies of Easter Island 
by Brander and Taylor (1998), Reuveny and Decker 
(2000), Dalton and Coats (2000) and Anderies (2000), 
and the study on the competition between Homo 
sapiens and the Neanderthals by Faria (2000). These 
models all include renewable resources by a standard 
logistic function which, together with a simple model 
of human activities, leads to a bioeconomic model.  
Our model includes the basic elements of ancient 
societies, describing the interactions between resource, 
population, and sunk costs, in order to understand 
under which conditions a society may be more likely 
to collapse.  
The renewable resource R is defined as the resource 
relative to its carrying capacity, and is formulated as a 
standard logistic model of which a certain amount is 
harvested. If there is no harvesting, the resource R will 
grow to amount 1, the carrying capacity of the 
resource.  
  
 
  [1] 
with the intrinsic growth rate gR and the harvest of the 
resource by human activities, which depends on the 
consumption level per capita c (resource amount per 
person) and the population size H (persons).  
Natural growth and migration determine the 
population of the society. First, we will discuss the 
population equation without migration. Like Anderies 
(2000), we distinguish a constant background change 
rate µH and a change rate depending linearly on per 
capita resource consumption. The rate µH can be 
interpreted as the net decrease in population size when 
the availability of resources is low and relatively more 
people die than are born. The rate c·e, with e being the 
person/resource amount, is the health- and culture-
related parameter and denotes by how many persons 
per unit resource consumption the population will 
increase. Higher levels of resources per capita lead to 
higher life expectancies, better living conditions, and a 
higher net fertility rate (survivors 1 year after birth). 
The population equation is  
  
 
  [2] 
Adding a migration rate µm to the standard population 
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model leads to  
     [6] 
   
 
  [3] where m is the consumption per capita of manufactured goods, parameter γ represents the 
elasticity of consumption with respect to harvest of the 
renewable resource. The population derives utility if 
they consume both bioresource goods and 
manufactured goods. If γ < 0.5, which is the case in 
our default parameter settings, consumption of 
manufactured goods derives higher utility per unit than 
consumption of bioresource goods. pc and pm are, 
respectively, the prices of bioresource and 
manufactured goods, and w is the wage rate. In this 
model, the wage rate represents a constraint that 
enables us to include the trade-off between spending 
labor to produce bioresource goods and manufactured 
goods. When the renewable resource is not restricting, 
optimization of time allocation leads to a fraction γ to 
spend on harvesting and a fraction (1-γ) to spend on 
manufacturing goods. In line with Anderies (2000), we 
assume that the people need to have a minimum 
amount of bioresource goods cmin to create a positive 
utility value. Thus, if the harvested bioresource is less 
than cmin, the population does not experience a positive 
utility, due to food scarcity. This leads to the following 
reformulated utility function:  
The migration rate depends on the available natural 
resources per capita. This indicator denotes that a 
higher level of natural resources reduces the 
emigration rate (see equation [4]). When there are no 
resources left, the total population will leave. Note that 
we do not explicitly include immigration, which may 
lead to an increase in population when circumstances 
in other regions are worse than in the region of 
interest. Because we do not yet include spatially 
explicit information, we omit possible inflow from 
surrounding regions. The parameter Ro presents a 
threshold value of resources available per person 
below which more than 50% of the potential migration 
flow leaves the region. The parameter η determines 
the steepness of the reaction to leave or not when the 
available amount of resources reaches a certain level. 
The migration rate can now be written as  
   
 
  [4] 
  
 
[7] The threshold Ro indicates when to leave. The lower 
the amount of resources per person, the higher the 
emigration. If η is low, the emigration is more or less 
linear to the average available amount of resources per 
person (R/H). However, when η is high, emigration is 
low until the average available amount of resources 
reaches the threshold Ro and the emigration rate jumps 
to high levels. The parameter η refers, therefore, to the 
response rate of the humans to a changing amount of 
available resources.  
Assuming a homogenous population of representative 
agents, we can describe consumption decisions at an 
individual level and translate them to the population 
level. In line with Brander and Taylor (1998), we 
assume linear production functions.  
   
 
[8] 
The economy of ancient societies is represented in a 
very simple way. The population allocates their time to 
the production and consumption of two goods, the 
bioresource goods (agricultural output and fish) and 
manufactured goods (tools, housing, and artistic 
output) (Brander and Taylor 1998).  
where C is the bioresource harvest, which is 
proportional to the product of the size of the resource 
and the amount of labor, LC, devoted to harvesting 
bioresources for food consumption. The parameter α is 
a harvesting efficiency coefficient. Manufacturing 
output, M, is only related to labor inputs, LM:  
A standard utility optimization U().  
   
 
  [9] 
   
 
  [5] By calculating the optimal allocation of time to 
maximize the utility function and by substitution, we 
derive the actual per capita amount of bioresource and subject to  
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manufactured goods (cf. Anderies (2000) for the 
derivation):  
The stock of manufactured products is assumed to be an 
indicator for sunk costs because it incorporates the 
amount of time spent on durable goods and practices. 
The more time agents spend in producing manufactured 
products, the more they build up sunk costs, depending 
on the strength of the sunk-cost effect denoted by ϕ. We 
assume that when sunk costs increase, the threshold Ro, 
when people migrate, increases. Thus, accumulation of 
sunk costs delays migration.  
   
 
  [10] 
and  
   
 
  [11] 
   
 
  [15] 
The harvest of bioresources per capita depends on the 
amount of resources available and an efficiency 
parameter, α (1/(resource amount * person)). The 
more abundant the resource, the more a person can 
harvest per unit of time. Because we assume that H = 
LC + LM, the amount of labor the population should 
devote to producing bioresource goods and 
manufactured goods is described as follows (see 
Anderies (2000) for a detailed derivation):  
MODEL RESULTS 
The default values of the parameters of the stylized 
model were chosen as follows (Table 1). The default 
value for gR is assumed to be 0.04. The value of e is 
chosen to be 1, which leads to a variable change rate 
of c, while the constant change rate µH is chosen to be 
0.02. The technical coefficient α is equal to 0.1. The 
value of the elasticity γ is 0.4, in line with Brander and 
Taylor (1998). The expected lifetime of the 
manufactured goods 1/µS is 10 years. The minimum 
consumption level cmin is assumed to be equal to 0.02. 
The response function of Ro is defined by ϕ equal to 4, 
and So equal to 0.5. This means that the threshold 
value Ro drops rapidly when the sunk costs surpass the 
level 0.5. The response level of µm is defined by η 
equal to 4, leading to a rapid increase in migration 
when the resource level per capita drops below Ro. The 
parameter values are not based on an empirical case, 
but are educated guesses for a typical society. We have 
performed a sensitivity analysis to confirm that our 
qualitative results are robust.  
     [12]
   
 
  [13]
Thus, when resource availability is low, αR < cmin, all 
labor is invested in harvesting bioresources for food. 
When resource availability is higher, part of the labor 
is spent on manufacturing goods. 
Figure 2 shows the stable cycle with a period of 200 
years for the default case. The population grows for 
almost 200 years, then drops in a few years when the 
majority of the population leaves the region. The length 
of the stable cycle depends on the minimum consumption 
level cmin and the steepness of the relationship between 
sunk costs and the relative resource level at which people 
migrate ϕ (Fig. 3). A higher level of cmin reduces the 
length of the stable cycle (to 140 years) and reduces the 
amplitude. This is caused by the fact that people 
recognize scarcity sooner, because they require high 
harvesting levels. A lower value of ϕ, a lower sunk-cost 
effect, reduced the length of the stable cycle. When 
responses to sunk costs are less steep, people are less 
likely to delay their migration.  
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that bioresource 
goods disappear after consumption, but that 
manufactured products are accumulated. The stock of 
manufactured products S increases with investments in 
manufacturing goods. The manufactured products 
have an average lifetime of 1/µk years.  
   
 
  [14] 
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Table 1. Default parameters of the model  
gR   0.04   - Maximum resource growth rate 
H   0.02   - Constant population change rate 
   0.4   - Elasticity parameter 
e   1   Persons/resource amount Resource conversion rate to persons 
   4   - Steepness parameter of migration 
   4   - Steepness parameter of threshold 
cmin   0.02   Resource amount/person Minimum consumption level 
   0.1   1/(resource amount*person) Harvesting efficiency coefficient 
So   0.5   - Level of sunk cost at which the level of Ro falls below 0.5 
S   0.1   - Depreciation rate of manufactured products 
Fig. 2. Stable cycle of a society with a period of 200 years.  
 
 
In Fig. 4, the fraction of time the representative agent 
is harvesting the bioresource is depicted against the 
average resource level per capita. At the outset, there 
is a low resource amount per capita, and the 
population invests all labor in harvesting bioresources, 
and reduces the harvesting time gradually when the 
resource amount per capita increases. The resource 
amount per capita increases due to a typical population 
decline in periods of food scarcity. The resource grows 
faster than the population until, at a certain population 
size, the resource per capita starts to decrease. When 
the resource per capita drops below 1, the fraction of 
time spend on harvesting increases to meet the 
minimum consumption level.  
 
Fig. 3. Stability cycles for three different parameter values. 
Case 1 uses the same parameter values used in Fig. 2. Case 
2 assumes a higher minimum consumption level (cmin). Case 
3 assumes, compared with Case 1, a lower steepness 
parameter value ϕ.  
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Fig. 4. Stable cycle of a society in terms of time spent on 
harvesting and the resource level per capita.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Bifurcation graph showing how the sunk-cost effect 
(ϕ) and the minimum level of consumption (cmin) influence 
the dynamics of the settlement.  
 
 
A more detailed analysis has been performed on the 
relationship between the sunk-cost effect, the 
parameter ϕ, and the minimum level of resource 
consumption cmin, which indicates a certain lifestyle. 
The higher cmin, the higher the resource per capita 
consumption before the population experiences utility 
of consumption of bioresources. Figure 5 shows that 
the occurrence of stable cycles is stimulated by a 
greater degree of sunk-cost effect. Furthermore, the 
minimum consumption level needs to fit within a 
specific range. If cmin is low, there is no scarcity and 
the population reaches a stable high level. If cmin is 
high, harvesting is so intense that the resource is easily 
depleted and people leave before they have built up 
significant sunk costs. The intermediate levels 
generate enough sunk costs to produce the stable 
cycle. Figure 6 provides more information by 
depicting the maximum population size. It shows that 
the sunk-cost effect is especially important for modest 
levels of cmin–between 0.01 and 0.04–and leads to a 
high maximum level of population. The resulting 
minimum level of population after the crash indicates 
that this range is the most sensitive for overshoot and 
collapse (Fig. 7). Note that sunk-cost effects 
themselves do not lead to overharvest of the resource. 
Also, without sunk-cost effects, equilibria of low 
population levels occur (Fig. 6). But inclusion of sunk 
costs leads to an overshoot and collapse of population 
levels, rather than evolving to an equilibrium in 
population level. 
 
Fig. 6. A three-dimensional representation of Fig. 5, where 
the population maximum is depicted on the vertical axis.  
 
 
In the evolution of civilizations, various parameters 
that are held constant can change. Technological 
development improves efficiency (and lowers hmin), 
but economic development and changing lifestyles 
increase the minimum level of resource consumption. 
Only a net reduction of resource consumption can 
reduce the risk of overshoot and collapse, given the 
human nature of the sunk-cost effect. We varied the 
parameters of the model to explore whether the 
qualitative results hold and, each time, the results 
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verified our insight that the sunk-cost effect together 
with a modest level of desired consumption from the 
resource lead to collapse dynamics.  
 
Fig. 7. A three-dimensional representation of Fig. 5, where 
the relative reduction in the population after a collapse is 
depicted on the vertical axis.  
 
 
Fig. 8. Distribution of population sizes of the society over 
10 000 time steps, expressed as a cumulative probability for 
experiments with and without sunk-cost effects.  
 
 
When we include a stochastic element to the model (a 
random number from a normal distribution with 
average zero and standard deviation 1 added to the 
growth rate) and simulate 10 000 time steps, we see 
periods of ups and downs with and without sunk costs 
(cmin = 0.02 and ϕ = 4) but, when sunk costs are 
included, the distribution includes more small and 
large population levels, suggesting larger booms and 
busts than would occur without sunk costs (Fig. 8). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our analysis of the sunk-cost effect in a standard 
social-ecological model is obviously rather simplistic. 
There are a number of ways the mathematical model 
can be improved: (1) the inclusion of more realistic 
resource dynamics (fast and slow dynamics), (2) a 
spatially explicit version that focuses on settlement 
patterns in a landscape, and (3) the inclusion of 
heterogeneity among agents (different characteristics 
of households). Such more elaborate models may help 
explain under which circumstances people can manage 
resilience of regions properly by allocating pressure on 
the system in a certain rhythm, and why some ancient 
societies did not succeed in this. An example of such 
an analysis is provided by Nelson and Hegmon (2001), 
who describe the temporal and spatial movement in 
the 12th century in the eastern Mimbres area, where 
depopulation of larger settlements might have been a 
strategy for maintaining occupation continuity in the 
region.  
It may seem that we argue that aggregation of people 
leads automatically to a collapse. However, there are 
many obvious benefits of aggregation. In fact, many 
archaeologists study the formation of states and other 
hierarchical systems. But, for the sake of analytical 
transparency, we have discussed only the effects of 
sunk costs in our stylized model of ancient societies. 
Note that sunk costs may also provide benefits. If 
people do not develop any sunk costs, they may use 
resources according to the “tragedy of the commons.” 
They enter a region, harvest the resource, and leave. 
Building up sunk costs offers them the opportunity to 
learn from the system and to develop effective 
institutions to regulate the management of the 
resource. The complex puzzle of evolving institutions 
has not been included in our simple model of ancient 
societies.  
Despite its simplicity, our analysis suggests that the 
sunk-cost effect could well be an important factor in 
explaining overharvesting of resources by ancient 
societies, leading to their collapse. Historical 
examples, like that of Anasazi societies, seem in line 
with our ideas, but a deeper analysis of the 
archaeological record would obviously be needed to 
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test the sunk-cost hypothesis more rigorously.  
As others have argued in this journal (Redman and 
Kinzig 2003), we believe that the study of ancient 
societies may also hint at new insights to current 
social-ecological systems. Besides providing an 
explanation for collapses of ancient societies, the 
sunk-cost effect may be linked to current development 
of social-ecological systems. It seems clear that our 
current consumption pattern and population growth 
cannot be sustained forever. Nevertheless, we have 
thus far found new ways of increasing complexity, 
such as new technology, without reducing energy 
consumption and population size. Ultimately, this may 
not be sustainable, but there are various psychological 
and economic reasons why our consumption pattern 
develops the way it does. Perhaps the sunk-cost effect 
may contribute to the explanation of why people 
continue to consume resources that are already 
overharvested.  
Certainly, there is abundant evidence that people do 
not behave like neoclassic models of man (Camerer 
2003). Decision making by humans is influenced by 
issues of fairness and loss aversion (Thaler 1992). The 
sunk-cost effect is just another example of empirical 
evidence contrasting with mainstream economic 
theory. Such insights from experimental social science 
might help us explain puzzling patterns, such as the 
collapse of societies, and the persistent question why 
humans often do not make rational decisions.  
Obviously, the link between the mechanisms that may 
have driven ancient societies into difficulty and current 
dynamics of societal development remains difficult 
and we do not wish to extrapolate too much here. 
Nonetheless, it may be reasonable to expect new 
collapses of societies. As Thor Heyerdahl (1998) 
reminds us, this would not be exceptional, but rather a 
continuation of historical events. 
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss1/art6/responses/in
dex.html 
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